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Abstract 
 
In 1998 the European Commission introduced into the political arena the concept of a 
‘European model of sport’ in the build up to the Helsinki Report on Sport, the 
Commission’s first attempt to formulate a comprehensive approach towards sport in the 
‘post-Bosman era’. In the recently adopted White Paper on Sport (July 2007), the 
Commission however considers it ‘unrealistic’ to define a single model of sport for 
Europe. This article argues that the Commission’s departure from its previous position 
deserves attention because it is an explicit acknowledgement of the transformations in the 
governing structures of European sport over the last two decades. The article suggests 
two possible motives for the Commission’s new understanding of European sport. First, 
the Commission is responding to the politicisation and redefinition of the concept of the 
‘European Model’ by sport governing bodies, who are attempting to forestall legal 
intervention by the European courts and the Commission. Second, the Commission is just 
acknowledging the reality of the new governance of sport. In this respect, the article 
focuses on professional football to argue that the governance of the sport in Europe is 
transforming from the old pyramidal and vertical structure to more horizontal 
configurations of stakeholder networks. The White Paper is just another indication of this 
process, and the Commission has used it to position itself within the network structure. 
The Commission, it is argued, has opted for a supervisory role, offering governing bodies 
a degree of ‘supervised autonomy’ where the specific role of federation is recognised in 
exchange for greater stakeholder representation within governing structures. 
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Introduction1 
In 1998 the European Commission drafted a document entitled The European Model of 
Sport (European Commission 1998b) as part of its ongoing consultations with sports 
organisations that led to the European Conference on Sport2 and, ultimately, to the 
Helsinki Report on Sport (European Commission 1999c). 10 out of the 23 pages of the 
document were devoted to the European model of sport, explaining the ‘organisation 
of sport in Europe’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 2-4), the ‘features of sport in 
Europe’ (p. 4-5), as well as the ‘importance’ (p. 5) and the ‘problems’ of sport in 
Europe (p. 7-9). Since then, this concept of a European model of sport has consistently 
featured in the debates concerning the sports policy of the European Union (EU). 
However, in the recently adopted White Paper on Sport, the Commission seems to be 
willing to liberate itself from the burden of the European model of sport when it 
affirms that it is ‘unrealistic to try to define a unified model of organisation of sport in 
Europe’ (European Commission 2007c, p. 12). This article explores the reasons behind 
the Commission’s distancing from the European model of sport which, it is argued, is a 
significant policy movement that seems to have been unnoticed so far. The article also 
situates the content of the White Paper within ongoing debates about sports 
governance.  
 
The article argues that in the White Paper the Commission has decided not to favour 
any particular regulatory approach because it acknowledges the complexity of 
European sport’s governing structures that have developed as consequence of the 
economic and structural transformations in the last two decades. Indeed, it is suggested 
that the White Paper could be considered as a certification of those changes, best 
exemplified by developments in professional football, It is increasingly difficult to 
reconcile the argument that the professional game has strong links with the amateur 
and grassroots levels. Whilst the governing bodies (the Union of European Football 
Associations, UEFA, and the Fédération International de Football Association, FIFA) 
have used the European model of sport to justify their policies and decisions in the 
past, other stakeholders involved in football governance, such as players and clubs, 
have challenged the legitimacy of the federations. The article also argues that with the 
White Paper the Commission reaffirms itself as having a role to play in the governance 
of professional sport, but not a powerful, normative and homogenising role (Weatherill 
2009, p. 111). It is more of a role of control, in line with the limited legal competences 
of the EU in the field of sport. The Commission is offering sports organisations, and 
particularly federations, a degree of ‘supervised autonomy’ (Foster 2000). 
 
The article will, thus, proceed in four steps. First, it traces the origins of the concept of 
a European model of sport and provides some context to the European Commission’s 
actions in the field of sport. Second it will present and explain the White Paper’s 
reference to the European model. Third, it will suggest possible explanations for the 
new position of the Commission, mainly referring to the politicisation of the concept 
by other actors and the transformation of professional football’s governance structures. 
Finally, the article reflects on the consequences of the White Paper for the debate on 
sport governance. 
 
The European model of sport: What is it? 
European Union institutions have been active in the field of sport for more than three 
decades. In particular, the European Commission has been one of the most active 
institutions in the area, although not by its own volition but rather due to the debate 
about whether different provisions of the EC Treaty are applicable to sport (García 
2007a, see also Rincón 2007, Parrish and Miettinen 2008). The European Union does 
not have a direct competence in the area of sport, but its institutions have been obliged 
to intervene mainly as a result of their duties to enforce the Treaty’s free movement 
and competition policy provisions. The commercialisation of sport attracted litigation 
from stakeholders who used the Treaty’s free movement and competition provisions to 
challenge the regulatory choices made by the governing bodies.  
 
Following the ECJ ruling in Bosman in 1995 and the subsequent increase in the sports-
related competition policy case-load of the Commission (Pons 2002), the European 
executive felt compelled to take a comprehensive approach to sport. In the view of the 
increasing activity within that sector, the Commission needed to reflect on the 
consequences of the ECJ rulings and also on how to apply EU law to sport if it was to 
fulfil its duties as guardian of the Treaties (European Commission 1996, European 
Commission 1999a). The European Council provided political guidance through the 
adoption of the non-binding Amsterdam and Nice declarations on sport (European 
Council 1997, European Council 2000). It has been argued that in all these documents 
there were two different and contrasting views of how sport should be approached by 
the EU: as an economic activity in need of regulation, or as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon in need of legal protection (Parrish 2003b, Parrish 2003a). It is in this 
context that the European Commission, as part of its reflections on how to treat sport, 
articulated the concept of the European model of sport. The way in which this concept 
is articulated is of paramount for the development of any EU policy on sport, for a 
reference to a European model which is characterised by vertical solidarity may have 
the potential to soften judicial intervention by the EU. This article focuses on the 
evolution of that concept, by analysing the changes in the definition of the European 
model of sport.  
 
The Commission’s responded to the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport (1997) by 
drafting an internal working paper on sport in September 1998 (European Commission 
1998a). The Commission prepared a consultation document for sport organisations to 
express their opinions. That document contained a descriptive section outlining the 
‘features and recent developments’ of European sport (European Commission 1998b, 
p. 1). It is in that description where the Commission first introduced the concept of a 
European model of sport: 
 
There is a European model of sport with its own characteristics. This model 
has been exported to almost all other continents and countries, with the 
exception of North America. Sport in Europe has a unique structure. For 
the future development of sport in Europe these special features should be 
taken into account (European Commission 1998b, p. 5) 
 
It is worth noting the comparison between the European model of sport and that of 
North America, a contrast that featured heavily in the Commission’s definition of the 
European model. Having established the alleged existence of the European model of 
sport, the document outlines its main features by focusing on two different aspects: the 
organisational structures of sport and the features of sport in Europe. 
 
The organisational structures of the European model 
The first characteristic of European sport highlighted by the Commission is the 
pyramidal structure in which it is organised (European Commission 1998b, p. 2). Sport 
is organised in a system of national federations, that are affiliated to European and 
international federations: ‘Basically the structure resembles a pyramid with a 
hierarchy’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 2). From the bottom-up, this structure is 
formed by clubs, regional federations, national federations and European federations 
(European Commission 1998b, p. 2-3). It is important to note that the Commission 
acknowledges not only the vertical dimension of this structure, but also its hierarchical 
nature, hence recognising the authority channels that come from the top (international 
and European federations) to the lower levels of the pyramid (clubs). The Commission 
explains that national and European federations have a ‘monopolistic’ position and that 
by using their regulatory power ‘these organisations try to maintain their position’ 
(European Commission 1998b, p. 3). 
 
The second organisational characteristic of the European model of sport is a system of 
promotion and relegation. The Commission explains that the pyramid structure 
‘implies interdependence between levels, not only on the organisational side but also 
on the competitive side’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 4). In other words, 
European sport is an open system of competition whereby low level clubs can 
hypothetically earn promotion to the top tiers of their respective sport3. This system, 
identified as ‘one of the key features of the European model of sport’, is in contrast to 
the US model, that has developed ‘a model of closed championships and multiple sport 
federations’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 4).  
 
The features of sport in Europe 
Further to the organisational characteristics outlined above, the Commission completes 
its depiction of the European model of sport with a look at three different features that 
are considered paramount: a grassroots approach, commitment to national identity and 
the existence of international competitions. 
 First, the Commission considers that one of the most important features of sport in 
Europe is that it is ‘based on a grassroots approach’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 
4). The Commission considers that the development of sport originates from the level 
of the local clubs and that, unlike in the US, it has not been traditionally linked to 
business (European Commission 1998b, p. 4). If the grassroots approach of sport is 
accepted, together with the system of promotion and relegation, this creates a strong 
link between the top and lower levels of sport and, in consequence, between the 
amateur and professional levels of sport. Thus, the European model of sport could be 
said to have an element of solidarity, according to which the objective of professional 
sport is not only profit maximisation but also support for amateur sport. Whether real 
or illusory, the notion of vertical solidarity in sport appears to underpin the 
Commission’s thinking.  
 
The second feature of the European model of sport highlighted by the Commission 
was the ‘commitment to national identity or even regional identity’, because it gives 
‘people a sense of belonging to a group’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 4). The 
third feature is the existence of international competitions where different countries 
compete against each other, demonstrating their different cultures and traditions and, 
thus, ‘safeguarding Europe’s cultural diversity’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 5). 
The Commission does not devote much discussion to this, but the sociological and 
identity aspects are certainly important features of sport (see for example, King 2000, 
Magee et al. 2005, Tomlinson and Young 2006). As the Commission suggests, sport, 
on the one hand, can be a vehicle for individuals to feel included in a group. This sense 
of belonging can be generated at the more amateur level by participating in sport clubs 
in various roles (coach, administrator, player, etc.) or at the professional level by 
following and supporting a particular team. On the other hand, sport is also a symbol 
of identities and, quite often, a reflection of clashing identities. National teams are a 
good example of the former, while the case of FC Barcelona, which is a symbol of the 
Catalan identity as opposed to a Spanish national identity, would be a good example of 
the latter.  
 
Therefore, to summarise the Commission’s view as of 1998, the European model of 
sport is characterised by a multi-level, pyramidal and hierarchical structure of 
governance that runs from the international federations down to the national 
federations and the clubs. This features a top-down vertical channel of authority where 
the federations, holding a monopolistic position within their sport, attempt to retain 
their hierarchical position. Furthermore, sport in Europe is characterised by a 
grassroots approach and a system of promotion and relegation, which implies a close 
link between the professional and amateur levels in sport. Having said that, it is also 
necessary to acknowledge that in the same document the Commission recognised that 
sport was undergoing, at that time (late 1990s), major changes. The Commission 
referred mainly to the globalisation and commercialisation of sport, best exemplified 
by the decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to abolish the 
distinction between amateur and professional sport for the Olympic Games (European 
Commission 1998b, p. 6). It also noted the conflict between top professional members 
and grassroots members of the sporting movement, mainly exemplified by the break-
away movements of professional football clubs in the 1990s (European Commission 
1998b, p. 7). Thus, the Commission seemed to be aware of the evolution of European 
sport, but it still decided to invest significant time in stressing the vertical solidarity 
elements of the European model of sport.  
 
The White Paper on Sport: A new look to the ‘European model’ 
The European Commission adopted a White Paper on Sport in July 2007 (European 
Commission 2007c). The White Paper on Sport is not a traditional white paper as it 
does not lay out a legislative terrain for further Commission regulation. The 
Commission wanted to enhance its status within EU sports policy given that previous 
political interventions arguably had come to little. The Commission considers the 
White Paper on Sport its ‘first comprehensive initiative on sport’ (European 
Commission 2007d, p. 1), whose aims are: 
 
Providing strategic orientation on the role of sport in the EU, encouraging 
debate on specific problems, enhancing the visibility of sport in EU policy-
making, raising awareness of the needs and specificities of the sector, and 
identifying the appropriate level of further action at EU level (European 
Commission 2007d, p. 1). 
 
In more practical terms, the White Paper hopes to contribute to ‘mainstream sport into 
the various relevant EU policies’ and to ‘increase legal certainty regarding the 
application of the acquis to sport, as a contribution to improved governance in 
European sport’ (European Commission 2007d, p. 2). The White Paper is divided into 
three sections. It opens by exploring the societal role of sport both at amateur and 
professional level (European Commission 2007c, p. 3-10). It then explores the 
economic dimension of sport in the EU (European Commission 2007c, p. 10-12). 
Finally, the White Paper addresses the problem of the organisation of sport in Europe, 
where issues related to the governance of sport, the specificity of the sector and the 
application of EU law to sport are addressed (European Commission 2007c, p. 12-17). 
For the purpose of this article, the interest is focused on that third part dedicated to the 
organisation of sport, where the Commission revisits the European model of sport:  
 
The Commission considers that certain values and traditions of European 
sport should be promoted. In view of the diversity and complexities of 
European sport structures it considers, however, that it is unrealistic to try 
to define a unified model of organisation of sport in Europe. Moreover, 
economic and social developments that are common to the majority of the 
Member States have resulted in new challenges for the organisation of 
sport in Europe. The emergence of new stakeholders (participants outside 
the organised disciplines, professional sports clubs, etc.) is posing new 
questions as regards governance, democracy and representation of interests 
within the sport movement (European Commission 2007c, p. 12). 
 
By declining to define a single model of sport, the Commission withdraws an 
important element of the political debate. As is explained below, documents such as 
the Independent European Sport Review (IESR) relied heavily on the necessity to 
maintain the features of the European model of sport as defined in the Commission’s 
1998 paper (see Arnaut 2006). If the European model of sport is not recognised, then 
much of those arguments would be void. In governance terms, whereas the European 
model of sport focused heavily on the role of federations, their regulatory role and their 
monopolistic position, the White Paper now points towards the emergence of new 
stakeholders. The Commission, therefore, is not only backtracking in respect to the 
pyramidal and vertical structure at the core of the European model, but it is also 
flagging the fact that there are other stakeholders gaining power and importance. It is 
true that the 1998 document referred to the clubs, but it did so from the amateur level 
and it certainly focused much more on the role, power and authority of federations. 
The White Paper refers to the emergence of new stakeholders as a challenge to existing 
structures that needs to be taken into account.  
 
The work of Roderick Rhodes can help in explaining the implications of the paragraph 
quoted above. He has pointed out that the concept of governance is perhaps used in too 
many contexts and with different meanings (Rhodes 1997, p. 47), but he narrowed it 
down mainly to two dimensions. On the one hand Rhodes (1997, p. 53) defines 
governance as a network structure with a large number of stakeholders ‘that interact 
continuously because they need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes’. 
The Commission’s willingness to highlight the importance of new stakeholders in 
European sport can be linked to this notion of network governance, where power and 
authority are diffused across the network, rather than in the hands of a single actor. 
This analysis clearly questions the regulatory powers of federations and governing 
bodies.  
 
On the other hand, Rhodes refers to governance as ‘good governance’, which involves 
the principles of effective, transparent and democratic management (1997, p. 49-50). 
This second dimension of governance was not present in the 1998 document. In the 
White Paper, however, the Commission notes the importance of questions such as 
democracy, representation and dialogue in European sport. This again has important 
implications for every stakeholder in the network, but it is of special significance for 
governing bodies because the Commission acknowledges that there are certain 
principles of good governance that should be respected. These principles may reduce 
the degree of independence of federations with respect to other stakeholders, but their 
implementation should improve the legitimacy of the governing bodies. It is important 
to note that the notions of good governance and network governance are 
complementary, as one would expect those involved in network governance to observe 
good governance principles. The need to develop effective principles of good 
governance arises from the need to comply with legal norms as well as to balance the 
diverging interests within the game (Gardiner et al. 2006, p. 153).  
 
Problems with the ‘European model of sport’ 
In the accompanying documents annexed to the White Paper, the Commission defends 
its refusal to define a single model of European sport mainly in two grounds: the great 
diversity of structures inherent to sport in Europe and the fact that many of the features 
of the model are global rather than exclusively European (European Commission 
2007b, p. 41). Further to that, this article also suggests that the Commission has been 
faced with a further element that distorted the use of the European model of sport in 
policy making: it has been politicised and used to their own advantage by different 
actors in the EU sports policy-making community. The most notorious example of the 
latter, as explained below, is the use of the European model of sport by sport 
governing bodies, with the IOC, UEFA and FIFA at the very front. Those 
organisations welcomed the focus on the pyramidal structure and the role of 
federations to justify their own policies and to avoid regulatory interventions by public 
authorities (e.g. national governments, EU institutions) or legitimacy challenges by 
stakeholders (e.g. clubs, athletes). 
 
The Commission acknowledges the limits of its own creature 
As pointed out above, the Commission acknowledges in the annexes to the White 
Paper the shortcomings of the European model of sport. The Commission is of the 
opinion that such a concept cannot reflect the real diversity of sport in the EU:  
 
It must be recognised that any attempt at precisely defining the ‘European 
Sport Model’ quickly reaches its limits. Some of the features often 
presented as ‘characteristic’, such as the system of open competitions based 
on promotion and relegation, are actually limited to a certain category of 
sport (team sport in this specific case). As a matter of fact, even for team 
sports the system of open competitions is somewhat mitigated by a 
licensing system that introduces financial criteria for participation in 
competitions. Other sports present in Europe have adopted a totally or 
partially closed system for participation in professional sport competitions, 
such as motor-sports or cycling (European Commission 2007b, p. 41) 
 
It is interesting to see that the Commission chooses some of its own past arguments, 
such as the principle of promotion and relegation in open competitions, to explain why 
the European model is not considered so central any more. This reinforces the idea that 
the Commission was unhappy with the implications of the European model’s 
description of 1998. The Commission then goes on to downplay another of its own 
arguments, the centrality of the pyramidal structure in European sport:  
 
The relevance of the pyramid structure for the organisation of competitions 
(and of the sport itself) is thus greatly reduced. It should be noted that the 
organisation of competitions also largely diverges from the pyramid 
structure in other sports, such as golf or tennis (European Commission 
2007b, p. 41) 
 
In other words, the Commission acknowledges that sport’s traditional vertical 
structures based on multi-level federations are now far more complex. The 
Commission notes the emergence of new stakeholders in sports governance, which are 
challenging the legitimacy and authority of governing bodies (European Commission 
2007c, European Commission 2007b, p. 41-42). This is another factor undermining the 
pyramidal structure and one can consider the Commission’s departure from the single 
model of sport in the White Paper as simply being an acknowledgement of that 
empirical reality. The governance of sport in the last decade is undergoing a process 
whereby the vertical channels of authority from the federations down to the clubs are 
being replaced by a more complex horizontal dimension of stakeholder networks 
(García 2007b, p. 221). Moreover, there were some sports, such as snooker, Formula 
One, boxing or darts, that never resembled the structural organisation described by the 
European model of sport in 1998.  
 
Of those sports conforming to the European model of sport, professional football is  
the best example of a transformation into new organising structures. New stakeholders 
such as the professional players trade union (FIFPro), the associations of top football 
clubs (be that the old G-14 or the newly established European Club Association, ECA) 
or the European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL) have now been recognised by 
FIFA and UEFA and incorporated to their consultation and decision-making 
procedures (García 2007b, p. 219 et seq., García 2009). The federations have 
incorporated representatives of the players, clubs and leagues to reduce the threat of 
breakaway competitions or litigation in the European courts. This is especially visible 
in UEFA’s Professional Football Strategy Council, a consultative but highly influential 
body comprising four representatives each of UEFA, EPFL, FIFPro and ECA. 
Although this has been a long process, the challenge of the G-14 to FIFA’s rules on 
mandatory release of players for national team duty (known as the Oulmers case) may 
be considered as a significant turning point in the relations between the governing 
bodies and the professional clubs. In the same way that Bosman also transformed the 
balance of power between players, clubs and federations. In Oulmers, G-14 and 
Belgian club Sporting Charleroi started legal actions under EU competition policy 
against the aforementioned FIFA rules. When the issue was referred for an ECJ 
preliminary ruling by the Belgian national court, G-14, FIFA and UEFA reached an 
out of court agreement in early 2008.  
 In addition to the ongoing arguments, the Commission is of the opinion that some of 
the features of the European model are not just only European, but rather global: 
 
On the other hand, what is often presented as constitutive of a unique 
‘European’ model can sometimes apply to the organisation of sport in other 
parts of the world or even globally. The European model of sport has been 
a successful model and many of its elements have therefore been adopted 
by other countries around the world (European Commission 2007b, p. 41) 
 
This last argument is probably more a question of semantics rather than a conceptual 
problem. It is even contradictory that in the same paragraph the Commission first 
seems to dismiss the European model and then takes some sort of pride in the alleged 
adoption of the model beyond the EU. However, the importance of this paragraph lies 
in the demonstration of the Commission’s willingness to find arguments to sustain its 
refusal to endorse again the European model of sport. 
 
Thus, the Commission, in the White Paper and its annexed documents, justifies its 
latest position about the European model of sport mainly in conceptual terms. It is 
basically realising that it is an expression unable to grasp the complexities of sport in 
the EU and, therefore, should not be prominent in the policy-making process. Those 
directly involved in drafting the White Paper explain this along similar lines. They 
suggest that the decision not to define a single model of sport in Europe was taken 
after careful research and intellectual analysis; they wanted to ‘test’ a concept that had 
been used for many years, but which seemed not to have been rigorously cross-
examined (Interview, European Commission Official, November 2007). The result was 
that they were faced with so many different structures and diversity in EU sport that 
they decided to abandon the idea of a single European model of sport. This, some 
would argue, contradicts the Commission’s traditional tendency towards 
homogenisation and approximation of policies among Member States, but it is 
necessary remember that the EU has no direct competency in sport. In this case it is 
logical (and probably welcome) that the Commission avoids a concept that might be 
seen as normative and harmonising throughout the EU. In this respect Stephen 
Weatherill (2009, p. 111) argues that the White Paper is ‘not tainted by inflated claims 
about the EU’s regulatory competence, it is a nuanced document worthy of the label 
“Better Regulation”. Weatherill suggests that the Commission is humble in the White 
Paper, aware of its lack of direct competence in sport (Weatherill 2009, p. 114). A 
willingness to stay away from over-regulation can also be a plausible motive behind 
the acceptance of the limits of the European model of sport. Having looked at the 
Commission’s own arguments, this section suggests now that there is a further element 
that can help to explain why the Commission found problematic the use the European 
model of sport, namely the adoption of the concept by stakeholders.  
 
The instrumentalisation of the European model of sport 
Once the Commission referred to the European model of sport in its 1998 documents, 
the concept seemed to take a life of its own due to the actions of different actors 
involved in EU sports policy-making. With the benefit of hindsight, it is probably fair 
to say that the Commission did not expect in 1998 the European model of sport to 
become such an important concept in the political game around EU sports policy. 
However, the legal challenges brought by stakeholders (football with cases such as 
Bosman or plans to create breakaway leagues is probably the best example, see García 
2007b) and the interventions of the Commission (European Commission 1999b, 
European Commission 1999a, European Commission 2001, European Commission 
2002) created an unstable environment in which the legitimacy of the federations was 
seriously challenged. In that context, it is not surprising that governing bodies 
welcomed any arguments that could reinforce their position. The European model of 
sport, with its focus on vertical solidarity and the central role of federations, was 
certainly of help. 
 
Federations decided to make the European model of sport one of their key arguments 
in their strategy to minimise legal and political challenges. Many sports federations 
regarded  the interventions of the ECJ and the Commission as dangerous attacks 
(Johansson 1995), but they found in the European model of sport an argument to 
forestall that legal intervention by the EU institutions. As Parrish and Miettinen (2008, 
p. 41-45) explain, the governing bodies argued that the features of the European model 
of sport should be considered part of the so-called ‘sporting exception’ and, therefore 
shielded against the application of EU law. This view was expressed in the 
Independent European Sport Review (Arnaut 2006).  
 
European football’s governing body, UEFA, is a clear supporter of the European 
model of sport. In its strategy document Vision Europe (UEFA 2005), the governing 
body, under the heading ‘UEFA’s philosophy’, refers to the European model without 
naming it:  
 
European football is structured as a pyramid and, as with any pyramid, a 
strong base is the only way to ensure a strong apex (…) Elite, professional, 
semi-professional and amateur football are inextricably linked through the 
pyramid, and each level supports the other levels. There is a magic thread 
running through the whole of football, from the most unknown player to 
the best player in the world – this link and chain should never be broken 
since it is a key component of the magic of football (…) UEFA speaks for 
the whole of European football. UEFA must always strive to keep the 
football family together (UEFA 2005, p. 11) 
 Logically, UEFA is keen to support the pyramid as an organisational structure for 
football and it is not surprising that a robust defence of this configuration is at the core 
of its philosophy and political strategy. UEFA refers here not only to its own role as a 
governing body with a duty to keep the pyramid together, but also to the intrinsic 
linkages between professional and amateur football, hence arguing that breakaway 
competitions would be negative to the sport in general. In terms of governance this 
means, of course, that UEFA sees itself in a central position of power, although the 
organisation realises governing bodies are not to abuse that power: ‘UEFA and 
national associations have a natural position of power when it comes to regulating 
football - this power must not be abused’ (UEFA 2005, p. 12). Based on that 
philosophy, which clearly resembles the concepts underpinning the European model of 
sport, UEFA’s political strategy is a decisive support of the European model. This is 
expressed in the strategy section of Vision Europe:   
 
UEFA and European football should continue with all levels of football - 
elite, professional, semi-professional and amateur - bound together as part 
of the same pyramidal structure. There should be no franchising and no 
encroachment on the fundamental principle of a link from top to bottom of 
the pyramid. The US model is appropriate in the US context, whereas in 
Europe sports federations have a central role in ensuring the essential 
solidarity between the various levels of sporting practice, from recreational 
to top-level sport. This is not only financial solidarity, but also sporting, 
moral, structural and other forms of solidarity. In order to most effectively 
achieve this essential solidarity, the pyramid must stay united (UEFA 2005, 
p. 27-28) 
 
UEFA makes a vigorous defence of the European model of sport and the football 
pyramid and, interestingly enough, contrasts it to the US model as the Commission did 
in 1998. UEFA is one of the best examples of a governing body adopting the 
arguments of the European model of sport, but it is certainly not the only one (for other 
sport bodies see for example International Olympic Committee 2003, FIFA 2006, 
Blatter 2007). The focus on UEFA is suitable because over the last years the 
organisation has taken the opportunity to reflect on its own political strategy and 
philosophy (see also UEFA 2005, García 2006, García 2007b). 
 
Once the sports governing bodies adopted the idea of the European model of sport, 
they were keen to float it within the policy community. This was done very clearly in 
the run up to the White Paper on Sport. Before drafting the White Paper, the 
Commission structured a dialogue and consultation process with the so called 
‘European sport movement’ where sport organisations were invited to discuss their 
views with the Commission (for details see European Commission 2007b, p. 110-115). 
In this consultation process, the International Olympic Committee together with the 
international Olympic sport federations submitted a common position to the 
Commission arguing in favour of maintaining and protecting the current structures (i.e. 
the pyramidal model and the role of federations):  
 
The responsibility that sport has in society and the autonomy with which it 
regulates itself lead to its credibility and legitimacy. Autonomy thus means 
preserving the values of sport, the existing structures through which it has 
developed in Europe, i.e. federations and clubs, the integrity of the 
competitions, the role of volunteers, the education of young athletes, and 
the contribution to public health in all age groups (…) The governance or 
organisation of sport does not fall within the EU’s competence and the 
White Paper must avoid attempting to change that status (International 
Olympic Committee 2007, p. 2) 
 
In the same document, which represents the vision of a large majority of sport 
governing bodies, the international and European football federations (FIFA and 
UEFA) add a particular statement that is very representative of this use of the 
European model for political purposes: 
 The fact that in football the elite commercial end is high profile and has 
strong interest groups should not negatively affect the democratic, self-
governing nature of the overall structure and model of sport in Europe. The 
fact that this model and structure exists is well-documented and established 
through various decisions and publications of the European political and 
sporting institutions. There is no need to repeat the detail of the key 
features of it here (…) This model produces enormous benefits for the EU 
and its Member States (…) It is now the turn of the Commission to express 
its views and to provide concrete proposals for action to give life to these 
beliefs and recommendations (International Olympic Committee 2007, p. 
6).  
 
The IOC, the Olympic sports federations, UEFA and FIFA argue here that sport in 
Europe has developed particular organisational structures (i.e. the European model of 
sport) and these arrangements (that is the pyramid with the federations at its core) need 
to be preserved. They clearly stress that the status quo need not be changed. Certainly 
the second extract (from FIFA and UEFA, but not including the IOC) goes further in 
requesting active measures by the Commission, but in both cases one can detect a 
normative use of the European model of sport. Ideally, these governing bodies would 
like to see a policy preserving and even helping to reinforce the European model of 
sport, which naturally means maintaining their own hierarchical position within the 
governing structures. In other words, the European model of sport is normatively used 
by the governing bodies in policy-making. This is in contrast with the Commission’s 
position. The Commission, despite all the pages devoted to the European model of 
sport, did not use it as a normative resource. The Commission referred to the European 
model as a description, not as a policy objective. Indeed, the same consultation 
document that portrayed the characteristics of the European model ended up by asking 
sports organisations whether policy should be oriented towards preserving the model 
or not: ‘Can we keep the European model of sport as it exists today? Should we keep 
the status quo or does the system need adjusting?’ (European Commission 1998b, p. 
11). Moreover, in the Helsinki Report on Sport the Commission is cautious in its 
language regarding the organisation of sport in the EU: 
 
There are many common features in the ways in which sport is practised 
and organised in the Union, in spite of certain differences between Member 
States, and it is therefore possible to talk of a European approach to sport 
based on common concepts and principles (European Commission 1999c, 
p. 3) 
 
Later in the Helsinki Report, the Commission makes another reference to sport 
structures that could be seen as policy oriented, but it is also relatively vague and 
conditional: 
 
If it is advisable, as wished by the European Council, but also the European 
Parliament and the Committee of the Regions, to preserve the social 
function of sport, and therefore the current structures of the organisation of 
sport in Europe, there is a need for a new approach to questions of sport 
both at EU level and in the Member States (European Commission 1999c, 
p. 7) 
 
Weatherill (2009, p. 111) argues that even with this vague approach the Commission 
already went too far in the Helsinki Report on Sport because its ‘general tone was 
directed at safeguarding current sports structures in Europe’ and there is a risk that ‘the 
EU strains its own legitimacy by taking on tasks it is ill-suited to discharge’ because, 
for example, it has no competence in law. Even if one accepts this argument, it is 
submitted here that there is a clear difference between the use of the European model 
made by UEFA, FIFA or the IOC (as explained above) and the Commission. 
Governing bodies welcomed the concept and argued that policies should be directed 
towards reinforcing that status quo, whereas the Commission was more hesitant and 
made no definitive claims. The Commission was rather floating ideas for an intra-
institutional dialogue. In a way, the White Paper is the culmination of that hesitation. 
Obviously, it is very difficult to prove that the Commission’s refusal to endorse the 
European model of sport was a direct consequence of the politicisation of the concept. 
As Kingdon points out, it is almost impossible to trace policy decisions to a single 
point of origin (Kingdon 1995). Yet, it is safe to affirm that, at the very least, the 
governing bodies’ strategy did not help the survival of the European model in the 
White Paper, if only because of the Commission’s lack of direct competence in the 
area of sport.  
 
‘Supervised autonomy’: A lifeline for a transformed European model 
It should be clear at this point that one of the main implications of refusing to endorse 
the European model of sport is to question the role and legitimacy of sports governing 
bodies. Yet, questioning does not necessarily mean denying. This section explores the 
implications of the Commission’s White Paper for sports governing structures, with a 
focus on the role, power and authority of federations. Additionally, the section also 
explores what the Commission has to say on the role of EU institutions and EU law in 
structuring European sport. The support of federations for the European model, it is 
argued above, can be linked to their desire to forestall EU legal intervention. Therefore 
it is necessary to consider, albeit briefly, the consequences of the White Paper for the 
application of EU law to sport.  
 
The White Paper is keen to highlight the emergence of new stakeholders in sports 
governance, which suggests a diffusion of the power and authority of governing 
bodies. That is certainly a reality and the case of football is, perhaps, the best example. 
The emergence of FIFPro, the EPFL and the ECA, which have all been incorporated 
into UEFA’s Professional Football Strategy Council has already been noted. But this 
diffusion of power goes beyond the sport’s internal structures to create new policy 
venues, external to the system, where stakeholders interact. That is the case of the 
social dialogue in the professional football sector, launched in June 2008 by the social 
partners (FIFPro representing the employees and EPFL and ECA representing the 
employers) under the umbrella of the European Commission and the legal basis of the 
EU Treaties. The creation of this social dialogue committee, which is formally outside 
the structures of UEFA, exemplifies the movement away from the strict pattern of 
vertical channels of authority defined in the European model of sport.  
 
But despite all these new stakeholders, is there still a role for federations in the eyes of 
the Commission? The answer to that question is affirmative. The movement away 
from the concept of a single European model of sport does not necessarily mean a 
decrease in the relevance of governing bodies in sports governance, but just 
realignment: 
 
The Commission acknowledges the autonomy of sporting organisations and 
representative structures (such as leagues). Furthermore, it recognises that 
governance is mainly the responsibility of sports governing bodies and, to 
some extent, the Member States and social partners (…) The Commission 
considers that most challenges can be addressed through self-regulation 
respectful of good governance principles, provided that EU law is respected 
(European Commission 2007c, p. 13). 
 
In this paragraph the Commission makes explicit mention of the governing bodies and 
their responsibilities in sports governance. Certainly, there is not a firm defence of 
their hierarchical and monopolistic position in the pyramid, but there is not a dismissal 
either. In the light of this argument, it is safe to affirm that the Commission’s 
reluctance to define a common European model is not a firm rebuttal, but rather a 
pragmatic necessity for a re-definition. It is also a certification of the empirical reality 
of modern sport, where structures have become more complex. Coming back to a 
concept already employed in this article, the Commission seems to assert that it is not 
willing to use the European model of sport normatively, but it does not want to 
determine its extinction either. The Commission does not see federations as 
illegitimate bodies, but the White Paper does not endorse their primacy in sports 
governance as other documents such as the Independent European Sport Review have 
done (Miettinen 2006, Smith and Platts 2008). The message of the White Paper is 
twofold. First, that there are alternative models to organise sport and it is up to each 
sport to decide which one to use, providing EU law and good governance principles 
are observed. This implies that the European model of sport will not be used as a 
normative concept to drive EU sports policy-making. Second, there are some features 
that were included in the definition of the European model whose importance is 
acknowledged as legitimate. One of those is the role of sports federations in sports 
governance. In the White Paper the Commission, for example, endorses club licensing 
systems operated by federations, such as the UEFA’s club licensing system in football. 
The Commission also reiterates that it is happy to assist governing bodies in promoting 
good governance practices in sport by creating a catalogue of good governance 
principles and funding conferences to explore the implementation of licensing systems 
(European Commission 2007c, p. 12).  
 
The White Paper shows a European Commission that is aware of its limitations to 
intervene in the sports sector, pointing towards good governance and self-regulation as 
the possible way forward in the organisation of sport. However, at the same time the 
Commission also affirms there is an area where the EU has full powers to scrutinise 
the actions of sports organisations: the application of EU law to their activities 
(European Commission 2007c, p. 13). The Commission’s reluctance to surrender this 
role has considerable implications because sports governing bodies have historically 
tried to minimise the application of EU law to their activities. In the run up to the 
White Paper the European federations of basketball, handball, volleyball and football 
requested the Commission to recognise the European model of sport by publishing 
clear guidelines on the application of EU law to sport that could counteract the 
possible consequences of ECJ rulings4: ‘Sport should not be ruled by judges’ (UEFA 
2007). The Commission, however, did not accept the federations’ argument. The 
Commission was bound to follow the ECJ’s ruling in Meca-Medina, which required a 
case by case approach the application of competition policy to sport. Therefore, the 
Commission did not include any guidelines in the White Paper and it made very clear 
that sport is still subject to the application of EU law (European Commission 2007c, p. 
14). 
 
To explain the implications of the White Paper for the governance of sport in a holistic 
manner, it may be useful to use the work of Ken Foster on the regulation of sport by 
the EU (Foster 2000). Foster analysed three alternative models of sports regulation by 
the European Union (Foster 2000, p. 43). First, the enforcement of private rights 
through the European Court of Justice (Foster 2000, p. 46). Second, the regulation of 
sport by the Commission through competition policy, which allows for exemptions to 
be granted in particular cases (Article 81.3 TEC). This was conceptualised as 
‘supervised autonomy’ (Foster 2000, p. 58). Third, a more political approach that 
would accept sports self-regulation without the intervention of EU law (Foster 2000, p. 
60). Building on Foster’s argument one can adapt that threefold typology to suggest 
three alternative visions of sports governance and, consequently, three different roles 
for EU institutions in those systems of governance. These should be understood as 
ideal types and they are defined here to help in our analysis. 
 
First, a direct or regulatory approach, where EU institutions would be an essential part 
of sports governance formulating policies about structures in sport. This is of course 
opposed by those advocating the specific characteristics of sport (Parrish 2003a). This 
approach would see an active role for the EU institutions in sports matters and would 
also imply that governing bodies’ autonomy could be reduced, perhaps to the level of 
being considered merely implementing agencies. In this model the role of the EU could 
be characterised as a regulator. 
 
Second, a level of ‘supervised autonomy’ (Foster 2000, p. 58), as suggested by Foster, 
where the sporting movement recognises the fundamental principles of EU law, but 
EU institutions do not have a proactive role in directly regulating sports governance, 
which is left to self-regulation. In this model, however, EU law adds a further layer of 
complexity because it is recognised that it applies to the activities of sports 
organisations. Here EU institutions would play a supervisory role to ensure sports 
organisations behave within the limits of EU law. In this supervision by EU 
institutions, there could be a debate about the specificity of sport. Sport governing 
bodies would try to reduce to a minimum the supervision of EU institutions, arguing 
that the specificities of the sector deserve a tailored application of EU law.  
 
The third model would recognise the total autonomy of sport and sport would be 
granted an exemption from the application of EU law. In this approach EU institutions 
would have no regulatory role in sports governance, but ideally they would endorse, 
support and facilitate sports governing bodies’ initiatives (eg. giving them political 
recognition or creating funding initiatives). In this model the role of EU institutions 
could be categorised as partnership. For many sports governing bodies that would be 
an ideal outcome: to be exempted from the application of EU law, but being able to 
receive funding through EU sports programmes. However, there is a basic 
contradiction in that ideal outcome. The EU can only allocate funds to sport related 
programmes if it has the legal competence to do it5. In the absence of such a 
competence, the Commission is unable to set up major sports-related funding 
initiatives. However, the creation of such a competence might risk evolving into 
further regulatory functions for the EU in the area of sport if one is to believe 
traditional neo-functionalist arguments (Haas 1968, Schmitter 2005). 
 
It is submitted here that in the White Paper the Commission suggests a ‘supervised 
autonomy’ in the governance of EU sport, where stakeholders are responsible for the 
organisation and good governance of their respective sport and EU institutions perform 
a supervisory function ensuring that they fulfil their duties in respect of EU law. This 
enables the Commission to avoid the normative use of the European model of sport 
whilst, at the same time, supporting some of its elements. From the governing bodies’ 
point of view, this should be seen as a lifeline in a moment where their legitimacy and 
authority was questioned by other stakeholders and the legal scrutiny of the ECJ and 
the Commission. The White Paper might question governing bodies’ primacy in the 
pyramid, but it affirms their significant role in sports governance. The Commission, 
however, demands a trade-off for that support: the application of EU law and the 
implementation of principles of good governance in sport. The Commission advocates 
that sport be governed in a horizontal structure of stakeholders networks where 
governing bodies will play a central or ‘steering role’ (Rhodes 1997). Although the 
White Paper is careful in explaining that any other model adopted by the sporting 
movement would be acceptable as long as it  respects  EU law.  
 
In that vision of a horizontal structure, EU institutions need be considered as also part 
of the network because they are likely to have a twofold role in the years to come. 
First, EU institutions (especially the ECJ and the Commission) will be supervising the 
application of EU law to sport, as explained in the White Paper. This is a powerful role 
because EU law might have considerable effects on the activities of sport 
organisations. EU institutions would be located within the network at a superior level 
to the governing bodies and other sport stakeholders due to the primacy of the law. 
Second, the Commission is happy to identify concrete areas in which its actions can 
add value to the work of federations and other stakeholders. This role can be 
characterised as partnership. The main objective of these partnerships shall be to 
ensure high standards of governance and a healthy development of sport. In this 
respect, the White Paper was accompanied by an action plan, called Pierre de 
Coubertin, that detailed a series of very concrete actions where the Commission can 
act in the benefit of sport within its current competencies (European Commission 
2007a). As a whole, this dual role of supervisor and partner in concrete areas is 
relatively well encapsulated by the concept of supervised autonomy. The debate is 
open, however, as to where to put the stress, in the supervision or in the partnership. 
The IESR advocated maintaining the autonomy of sports organisations, hence 
privileging the EU partnership role over the supervision. However, the White Paper is 
much more cautious. The White Paper is very clear in stressing the necessity of 
supervision, but without neglecting the autonomy. Future challenges will tell whether 
this equilibrium is changed or not. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In 1998 a consultation document of the Commission introduced the concept of a 
European model of sport, which was defined by its pyramidal structure of governance 
with a central role of sports federations. Over the last decade the vertical channels of 
authority within the pyramid have been challenged by sports stakeholders, particularly 
those in football. Many of those challenges came in the form of cases brought to the 
ECJ or the Commission. In the 2007 White Paper on Sport, the Commission 
considered it ‘unrealistic’ to define a single model of sport in Europe. The 
Commission’s reluctance to support the European model of sport can be explained by 
a series of reasons. First, the transformations in the governance structures of sport in 
Europe over the last decade. Second, the Commission’s desire  to avoid over-
regulation. Third, the politicisation of the concept in the hands of some sports 
governing bodies, especially the IOC, UEFA and FIFA. Whereas the Commission 
conceived the European model of sport largely as a descriptive tool, sport governing 
bodies incorporated it into their political strategies, hence making normative use of it. 
Governing bodies were interested in the European model of sport not only to support 
their hierarchical situation in relation to other stakeholders, but also to minimise the 
legal interventions of EU institutions in the field of sport. 
 
Having said that, the White Paper is not a total dismissal of all the elements identified 
in the European model of sport. The Commission is keen to recognise the importance 
of some of the features of the European model such as the role of federations, but in a 
new and more modern context of sports governance. The Commission’s vision of 
sports governance is of a complex horizontal dimension of stakeholder networks. The 
Commission also considers that it has a dual role to play in this structure. On the one 
hand, the Commission would act as a supervisor because it shall ensure the respect of 
EU law by sports organisations. On the other hand, the Commission may also act as a 
partner. It will identify areas in which it can help to promote best practice in sports 
governance. Despite other caveats, the White Paper deserves to be praised, at least, 
because it is a serious attempt at finding balance in the very complicated debate about 
of sports governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A first version of this article was presented at the 3rd annual Sport&EU workshop in Southport, July 
2008. I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. 
2 Also known as the Assises européennes du sport, this was a large conference held in Olympia (Greece) 
on 20 to 23 May 1999 where the Commission hoped to gather the opinions of the sporting movement in 
respect of the EU policies on sport (see European Commission 1999c, p. 3).  
3 See for example the case of German football club TSG Hoffenheim, a small club founded in 1945 that 
has seen recent success after receiving financial support of a German multibillionaire. Hoffenheim was 
promoted from non-league regional football to Germany’s fourth division in 2000 and since then it has 
escalated to the Bundesliga, German football’s top tier, where it enjoyed top positions for most of the 
2008-09 season, finishing 7th, just six points away from playing European club competitions.  
                                                                                                                                             
4 Similar requests regarding the publication of guidelines on the application of EU law to sport were also 
introduced in the Independent European Sport Review (Arnaut 2006, p. 96 et seq.) and in the European 
Parliament’s report on the future of professional football in Europe (European Parliament 2007, 
paragraphs 7-8), although to different degrees. The European Parliament was much more cautious, 
explicitly stating that specific features of sport ‘do not warrant an automatic exemption from the 
Community competition rules’ (European Parliament 2007, paragraph 54). 
5 As acknowledged by the European Court of Justice in the ruling of UK v. Commission, case C-106/96, 
ECR [1998] I-0729 (Parrish and Miettinen 2008, p. 31-32). 
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